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REGULATION-MAKING: THE CREATIVE OPPORTUNITIES OF THE
INEVITABLE
H. W. ARTHURS*
The lawmaking process has diffused substantially in the past years,
resulting in an increasing maze of departmental subordinate legislation.
This phenomenon has not been accompanied by a parallel development
of controls resulting in complaints about "bureaucracy", red-tape, inaccessability, and poor draftsmanship, and in demands for review and
control. Professor Arthurs recognizes the practical inevitability of the
system, but discusses the present situation critically, suggesting reforms
which might help to make the regulatory process more compatible with
"participatorydemocracy".

The Special Committee on Statutory Instruments of the Canadian
House of Commons was established to consider a universal legislative
dilemma: Should parliament itself assume responsibility both for articulating policy and for filling in the details of that policy and directing
the manner of its implementation? Or should the cabinet and other
administrative intrumentalities be permitted wide lattitude to make "subordinate legislation", subject only to fairly broad policy instructions
given by the Legislature?
I
Let me declare my position at the outset. There ought to be the
broadest possible mandate for regulation-making, and parliament ought
to confine itself (so far as possible) to the announcement of broad policy
lines within which regulations may operate, and to the scrutiny of those
regulations. Saying that, I realize that I fly in the teeth of a good deal
of the current concern with bureaucracy, with hidden power in
government, with all the other sinister influences which are thought to
lie athwart the rights of the citizen. I suggest that while in strict theory
all law must be made by the legislature, while in strict theory judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies merely interpret and apply the law, while in
strict theory ministers and other lower-level administrators simply
execute instructions given by parliament, it is time to recognize that
theory does not, cannot, and indeed should not accord with actual practice.
There are many important reasons why "regulations" or subordinate
legislation must be enacted.
1. At the head of the list is tthe fact that parliamentary time is at a
premium and should, therefore, be reserved for doing what parliament
does best, namely, debating issues of great public importance at the
level of principle and of policy rather than at the level of detail. This
type of debate informs the public and attracts and engages its attention
more or less in direct proportion to the degree to which it focusses on
intelligible issues. The minutiae of administration are not such issues.
Thus legislation should be drafted broadly so as to focus parliamentary
and public attention on policy, while questions of detail should be left
to be filled in afterwards by those best technically equipped to do so.
* B.A., LL.B.

(1958), LL.M. (1959), Professor and Associate Dean, Osgoode Hall Law
School of York University. This note is based upon evidence presented to the Special
Committee on Statutory Instruments of the House of Commons of Canada (Dr. Mark
MacGuigan, M.P., Chairman) on April 22, 1969. The committee's third (and final)
report has now been issued (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969).
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2. Important legislation may have to be enacted without full
knowledge of the social facts of the matters being legislated upon, or
of the precise implications of legislation. Some harm to the public interest is sought to be eradicated: the harm may be obvious but not its
causes, the causes may be obvious but not the cure-yet the decision
has to be taken to deal with the problem. Three alternatives exist in
such a situation.
Firstly, it is impossible to assume (without empirical proof) that
certain facts exist, on the basis of which detailed legislation can be
drafted. If those factual assumptions turn out to be sound, no harm is
done. If they should turn out to be unsound, this approach may have
created a very serious and dangerous situation in which the legislation
might turn out to be entirely inappropriate and unworkable.
Next, in the absence of verifiable factual knowledge, we might go
to the other extreme and confer unfettered license upon a minister or
administrative agency to decided cases on an ad hoc basis. This approach
has the merit of permitting decisions to be made in context. As time
goes on the minister or the administrative agency presumably becomes
better and better informed and the decisions that are made are more
and more responsive to the particular problems coming forward. However, here we encounter a very justifiable concern by those who must
comply with these decisions, appear before the tribunal or make submissions to a minister in a particular case: they should know what the
rules of the game are so that they can conduct themselves accordingly.
Moreover, to deal with important social problems on the basis of a
series of ad hoc decisions inevitably leaves substantial areas about which
no rule at all has been proclaimed because the problem has not yet
been presented for decision.
Because of the risks of these two extremes, we must increasingly
resort to the third alternative, the alternative of subordinate legislation,
when we are confronted with a situation in which we do not know,
and cannot know, what all the facts are until we begin the process of
regulation. To authorize the making of subordinate legislation or regulations by some appropriate and knowledgeable person within the broad
policy framework established by parliament escapes the excessive rigidity of the first alternative and the excessive vagueness of the second.
Yet it does enable the administrator, or the minister, to conduct serious
research into altering the rules, with due advanced warning, as it
appears that they ought to be altered on the'basis of experience, as
more and more facts come to the surface, as they begin more and more
obviously to form a pattern.
There is a final practical consideration. No statute can be drafted
so carefully and completely as to avoid the necessity for further adumbration, either by a process of ad hoc decisions, or by subordinate legislation. Thus, it is a choice between techniques of extra-parliamentary
lawmaking which actually confronts us. Given the realities of parliamentary time pressures, given the difficulty of ascertaining the social
facts and of making an intelligent estimate of the kinds of solutions
needed for problems which are only half-perceived at the time the
decision is made to begin to solve them, recourse to detailed legislation
cannot be considered as a workable expedient.
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3. We are increasingly attempting regulation in fields of activity which are of a technical or scientific nature. While parliament
is able to specify the general objectives which are to be achieved, it
really cannot meaningfully discuss the substantive details of regulation.
These details must be worked out on the basis of technical and scientific
advice after consultation with experts and must be stated in terms
which are intelligible to experts, which use appropriate scientific or
technical terminology, and which provide for the participation of experts
in the administration of the rules. In this way, the actual quality of
rules is likely to be improved both from the public point of view and
from the point of view of those who are being regulated.
4. Next, we have those situations where the field of activity being
regulated may be-and often must be-of a particularly fluid nature.
Here we need to be able to continually revise the substantive rules,
often very rapidly in response to shifts in the economy or to new technological or scientific developments. For example, it would be impossible to continually amend legislation to regulate specifically each of
the hitherto undreamed-of drugs which continually emerge on the
market. In addition, more and more developments in areas of regulated
activity take place not merely by reason of scientific innovation, but
by reason of a constantly changing perception of the social situation
or social values. It must be possible to continually match the rule to
meet the problem. This can only be done if someone below the level
of parliament itself is able to announce the rule, and to announce it
with a fair degree of speed, as well as technical competence.
5. The content of a rule or a regulation may be predicated upon
the views of those who are being regulated. It may thus be desirable
to adopt a form of law-making which facilitates the expression of
these views from time to time. This is participatory democracy at
a fairly sophisticated level, for example, if we regulating broadcasting,
we should encourage the intelligent expression of views about desirable
policy as well as about the problems encountered in particular cases,
so that we can intelligently formulate rules. With such participation by
those affected, not only will the rules be better, but those people who
are governed by them will come to feel that they have a stake in them,
will come to feel that they are responsive to the actualities of the
industry or the social situation being regulated.
6. Certain details of administrative schemes, particularly those
which are of a procedural or a housekeeping nature, may be unworthy
of the attention of parliament or sufficiently non-controversial to justify enactment without direct parliamentary intervention or supervision.
7. Finally, and as a broad point, it does seem to me that legislation
should be reasonably simple, reasonably easy to read and of a longlasting or permanent character. Each of these qualities is diminished to
the extent that more ephemeral matters are dealt with by legislation or
to the extent that legislation incorporates a mass of details without any
great substantive significance.
For all of these reasons it is highly desirable that substantial opportunity be given to appropriate officials and bodies to make regulations
or rules, many of which will have a significant impact on the procedural
and substantive rights of citizens. Thus, we should attempt not to
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diminish the scope within which subordinate legislation is permitted
to operate. Rather we should seek to ensure that in its operation, and
in the process of its enactment, there exist adequate safeguards and
opportunities for ultimate debate about policy issues in the public
forum, and for full knowledge by those whose conduct is being regulated of the rules to which they are expected to conform.
II
I now turn to the procedure by which regulations ought to be made.
I have already touched on the virtue of providing for participation in
the regulation-making process by those who are subjected to the cuttingedge of regulations. To the extent that a statutory order or instrument
may be aimed specifically at a particular individual or a particular
group, elementary principles of fairness seem to me to demand that
an opportunity be given to that individual or group to be heard. This
opportunity may be afforded by informal consultation, by an invitation
to submit a brief or (alternatively, but not necessarily) by a full-dress
public hearing. In some cases, at least, such participation must follow
rather than precede the promulgation of an order or a regulation, because of the potential for great damage to the public interest which
would occur if the regulation were withheld until the consultative procedures had been exhausted. On the other hand, as a general matter
of principle, participation by the governed in the process of government
is likely to enhance the effectiveness of the regulatory scheme. And
as a corollary, the sudden and unannounced emergence of a regulation
affecting the lives or livelihood of individuals and groups is likely to
produce in them a feeling of resentment and antagonism, and unwillingness to abide by the policies and practices proclaimed in the regulation.
Neither legislation nor subordinate legislation nor regulations are, in
my view, mere collections of words. They are rather the embodiment of
value judgments based upon experience and familiarity with the subject
matter. I therefore have great reservations about the philosophy that statutory draftsmanship is a pure science. While I immediately concede the
need for participation by skilled draftsmen, both as to form and content, I
am very anxious that statutory instruments should reflect the milieu in
which they are intended to operate. Thus it follows that a predominant
influence in the actual drafting of regulations ought to be the department or agency charged with the task of administration. I would add
that where members of the public are involved closely and directly
with the administration, as for example in the labour relations field
and the immigration field, particular care should be taken to frame
regulations in non-technical and easily understood language so that
the citizen who is faced with the task of coping with those regulations
can in fact do something intelligent to secure his own interests. Naturally, a more colloquial approach involves a sacrifice of uniformity.
III
We must now confront the difficult question of who should make
regulations. Obviously, the answer to some degree depends on the type
of regulation. Rules relating to procedure or housekeeping, most people
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would agree, can and should be made directly by the department or
agency involved. Where a regulations relates to substantive policies,
we should move the process of regulation-making to a fairly high level,
perhaps to an independent regulatory agency such as the Canada Labour
Relations Board or to cabinet itself, depending on where in the particular case responsibility for formulating policy resides. If it is appropriate to keep policy-making within the purview of cabinet, then
obviously cabinet must exercise its responsibility for making that policy
by announcing it in a regulation. If, on the other hand, it is felt more
appropriate to give a fairly broad mandate to an independent and expert
agency, then that of course is the appropriate location for the making
of the regulation. We should be particularly careful not to thwart the
implementation of important public regulartory schemes by forcing the
regulation-making function into busy cabinet agenda, especially where
no policy issues are involved.
IV
The review of regulations is clearly a matter of major concern to parliamentarians. Obviously, review may be undertaken for different purposes and therefore requires different procedures. Review, for example,
might have as its objective the simple purpose of collection: how can
we make sure that we have in hand all regulations relating to a particular subject? Someone who might be termed a "registrar of regulations", someone whose function is essentially a clerical one (but one
requiring considerable care and sophistication) could safely be given
the job of "review" in this limited sense of ensuring the completeness
of a code of regulations. Another example: if we are concerned about
review .of regulations for the purpose of ensuring their intelligibility,
internal consistency or linguistic sophistication, here again we could
give the job either to a registrar of regulations or to a branch of the
Department of Justice. There are seldom great issues involved in such
purely technical scrutiny, which ought to be undertaken before regulations take effect.
If review is intended to ensure that regulations do not offend the
Bill of Rights or otherwise unduly infringe upon principles of fairness,
this obviously requires a much higher order of supervision. No doubt
for this reason, many countries provide for direct review by the legislature or by a legislative committee. The same approach has been prescribed for Canada's parliament. In my submission, however, to simply
establish a routine procedure for the tabling of some or all regulations
either before the House of Commons or a special "watchdog" committee
of the House, does not quite meet the problem.
To be effective, review at this level must, above all, be informed;
it must be contextual. A great American administrative law scholar has
said that "one man's due process is another's red tape". He was suggesting that one cannot really evaluate the degree to which a particular
procedure infringes upon even such a basic policy as due process without seeing it in the lefe context. Consider this illustration: a regulation
establishes a time limit of 10 days for the doing of an act. In the abstract
this time limit may seem reasonable, even innocuous. But 10 days,
given the particular field of activity, may be as an instant or it may be
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an eternity; one cannot judge without an accurate knowledge of how
rapidly events move. What can one really say about a time limit without immersing oneself in the realities of the social or economic events?
It may be also very important to determine whether or not a regulation changes or initiates policy in a particular field or activity. One
often cannot tell very much about policy by reading the statute since
the operative policy choices are articulated only in the regulations.
Here again is an illustration of the prime importance of having informed review: only with a perspective gained from continuous observation of the field of activity over a period of time is it possible to
understand the true impact of a regulation.
Which body then, is likely to be most knowledgeable-in a relevant
way-about the significance of a regulation? The bodies which are
potentially most qualified to perform the reviewing function are the
standing committees of the House, concerned with such subject matte
areas as agriculture or labour, transportation or broadcasting.
As I envisage it, review would proceed in two ways. First, there
ought to be periodic review of legislation and of regulations made
under legislation, at least of the major statutes which govern the subject matter areas with which the committees are concerned. Every five
years or seven years (or some such reasonable period of time) it should
be possible to evaluate the way in which a policy has developed, and to
scrutinize in policy terms the regulations made since the last periodic
review. I visualize a full-scale look at what has happened, say, in the
field of manpower policy or broadcasting policy. As part of that process regulations would necessarily have to be collected and evaluated
in the terms of their policy implications.
There is another, and more frequent, opportunity for review.
It is expected that the standing committees will acquire considerable
familiarity with the subject matter to which they are assigned. Regulations could be routinely circulated to committee members for scrutiny
by them as part of the on-going process of educating themselves and of
monitoring the particular subject matter within their field of competence. A member of the committee, or some appropriate number of
members, could provoke a committee debate on a regulations deemed
be of importance by some appropriate procedure.
Needless to say, professional staff must be placed at the disposal
of committees charged with this obligation to review, staff who can
give very careful scrutiny to the regulations, who can make significant
enquiries as to the actual operation of the regulations, and who can
record how those regulations affect great constitutional principles or
policies embodied in other sources.
The case for review by standing "subject-matter" committees, rather
than by a special "watchdog" committee, can be made another way.
-There is the risk that a "watchdog" committee would develop a psychological vested interest in its function, a propensity to play the role
assigned to it. Tell its members "your role is to ferret out injustices in
regulations", and they will ferret out injustices in regulations. Tell them
''your role is to develop a coherent and fair system of administering
this particular subject matter" and they will tend to focus on that task.
Nor is the protection of the public likely to be lessened if it is con-
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signed to "subject-matter" committees. Real unfairness often does not
become obvious from a mere reading of the words of a regulation, but
only from an assessment of their impact upon the particular area of
life being regulated. Likewise, unfairness may sometimes falsely be
made to appear if one considers a regulation in the abstract rather than
in context.
What if a reviewing committee should decide that a regulation
violates some constitutional principle or is for some other reason deemed
offensive? If an appropriate committee does formulate the view that
there is such a defect in a regulation, it should be permitted to table
in the House of Commons a report indicating both its objection to the
regulation and the defence of that regulation advanced by those who
have made it. This report ought to be regarded as a matter worthy of
the attention of the House, and appropriate opportunity afforded for
debate. If the House decides to impeach the regulation, this might be
accomplished by resolution. Given a reasoned report outlining both the
defects and the defense of the regulation, there is some assurance that
such a resolution would be the produce of sober consideration.
Because of the infrequency of committee and parliamentary sittings,
regulations ought to take effect when they are made, subject to impeachement by the procedure outlined above. A pending regulatory
scheme should not have to be kept in a state of suspended animation
until the distant date at which a committee can be assembled, especially
if the House is not sitting. It must be conceded that if a regulation is
made and subsequently impugned, there is some injustice visited upon
those who have meanwhile been affected by it. If penalties have been
imposed for breach of a regulation which is subsequently overturned,
those penalties can usually be remitted. If significant business loss has
been suffered, there is cold comfort for those affected by the ultimate
vindication of their position.
Yet I really do not see any great risk in such expedient transaction
of public business. Few regulations, after all, are lightly promulgated,
or likely to be embarked upon entirely without guidlines laid down
by Parliament or, for better or worse, immune from judicial impeachment on the grounds of ultra vires.
It is sometimes urged that parliamentary scrutiny is unnecessary
because of the general supervisory role of the Department of Justice.
While undoubtedly helpful, this is not the answer to all of our problems.
The Minister of Justice obviously has his own axe to grind in these
matters; he has many other concerns, including the reputation of the
government of which he is a member. I therefore do not view his department as the ultimate safeguard in ensuring the appropriateness and
fairness of regulations.
Finally, we come to court review. Court review is not a very practical device, and, to the extent that it is, it is largely undesirable. Obviously we cannot prevent a court from finding that regulations do not
fall within the scope of a statute. This happens, occasionally, when the
court is not sensitive to the nuances of the regulatory scheme or is
unsympathetic to the whole purpose of the scheme. From time to time,
in such circumstances, courts have by a literal-minded process of in-

ALBERTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VIII

terpretation, seized the occasion to strike down or inhibit some very
valuable schemes.
Many times, if one wants to look at it from the other point of view,
it is not a question of the court being too eager to intervene, but of
there being no real way in which the court's attention can be attracted.
Often no one has standing to complain to the court that a particular
regulation or a particular policy is offensive, either procedurally or in
substantive terms, since no one has a personal grievance, or has suffered an injury which is different from that suffered by the public as
a whole. In that sense, if one is intervention-minded the court route
does not seem terribly promising.
My lack of enthusiasm for judicial review-and for review by a
"watchdog" committee-proceeds from a general scepticism about
whether much is to be gained by "putting the fear of God" into administrators. I concede that there are in any administration, whether of
the federal government or provincial government (or even the university) people who are so rule-minded, so insensitive to human beings,
that they insist on deliberately trampling over people, whether by
making regulations or particular decisions; that obviously does happen.
However many more injustices are perpetrated by well-intentioned
people who simply have not directed their minds to the problem of
fair dealing. The solution for those people, who are involved in the
great majority of cases, is not to put the fear of God into them. Rather,
it is to create an atmosphere in which they see their objective not only
as getting from point A to point B in terms of executing policy, but
of getting there by a route which is consistent with the values of a
democratic society.
How do we do this? Not by scrutiny, whether by court or by committee, after the event. We do it at the beginning of the process. We do
it by holding seminars for administrators who are in a position to make
this kind of decision; we do it through training, manuals, publications
and policy statements, which may or may not have legal force. We do
it by creating a consciousness in the minds of the people who are making
decisions and making regulations, that they must be sensitive to the
basic values of fair dealing. Although many of them are very fine people,
they are very busy people and they are never asked (except in a critical
sense when they have offended) to pause and consider basic concepts
of due process. Let us do something affirmative before the fact, rather
than punish them after the fact by embarrassment and chastisement.
V
Publication and consolidation are our final concerns.
Statutory instruments which bear narrowly on an individual or a
small group present no special problem. It is possible to bring a regulation to the attention of that individual or group by personal service
upon them. Indeed, this principle is certainly recognized in many
statutes which govern the effect of statutory instruments: a person who
has personal notice that a regulation has been passed is bound by it.
However, it is indisputable that statutory instruments which have
the effect of rules governing the.conduct of the public, or a broad sector
of the public, should be published, and that they should be freely avail-
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able for inspection at the time and place at which they are being applied.
Customs and immigration are two notorious areas in which regulations are often not freely available at an appropriate time and place to
those who are being subjected to them.
In this connection, to repeat a point already made, regulations should
be intelligible to the persons affected by them. The pure science of
drafting, so prized in some circles, ought to give way to intelligibility.
There is no more important principle than intelligibilty when laws affect
layment. And there is no more important principle in aid of intelligibility,
besides the actual selection of words, than the consolidation of words,
the review of random regulations made from time to time, and their
republication in some coherent and collected form.
There are many solutions to this problem which have been adopted
by private publishers, some of which are occasionally resorted to by
governments. There is the obvious expedient of periodic consolidation.
How periodically things are consolidated, or ought to be consolidated,
is perhaps a matter of debate. I, for example, do not consider consolidation of the 1952 Revised Statutes of Canada at some date subsequent
to 1969 as being quite periodic enough for my taste, but I can see that
tastes may differ in this regard. That is the classic method of bringing
together regulations and legislation. There are more up-to-date methods
such as the loose leaf services offered by the many private law publishers and people in other lines of endeavour, who meet the recurring
need to keep a body of material both current and consolidated. I see no
reason why such expedients could not be used.
There is, of course, the wave of the future: computerized retrieval.
I envisage ultimately a situation in which there are a number of local
routes into a central federal legislative computer bank which contains
all statutes and regulations administered by the various departments
and agencies of government. Someone administering those rules in
Toronto or Vancouver or Quebec City or Halifax, should, by means of
a fairly simple dialogue with this device, be able to obtain a definitive
answer to the question, "What rules govern the situation?" The opportunity to ask the. question and obtain the answer should be equally
accessible to the citizen. I cannot think of anything more likely to give
rise to genuine concern about the process of regulation-making within
government than denial to citizens of free and full access to the rules
that are made.

